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INTRODUCTION
Last summer, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
issued an unusual sua sponte order. An appeal had come from the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board, a tribunal within the Patent Office
that reevaluates the validity of patents that the agency previously
issued. The owner of the patent at issue had lost in the tribunal and
sought review. The prevailing patent challenger did not defend its
victory on appeal, but the Patent Office intervened to defend its
tribunal’s decision. The Federal Circuit asked, among other things,
whether maintaining the appeal would violate the case or contro-
* Associate Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law; Associate
Professor, Texas A&M University Dwight Look College of Engineering; Fellow,
Duke Law Center for Innovation Policy. The author was formerly an expert advisor
at the United States Patent and Trademark Office. The arguments in this writing
are the author’s and should not be imputed to the USPTO or to any other
organization. Sincere thanks to Dmitry Karshtedt and Tanya Pierce for helpful
discussion, to Nathalie Gorman for inviting this article, and to Avi Laham and
David Moosmann for research assistance.
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versy requirement of Article III of the Constitution. Did the
agency’s Director have standing—indeed, was the Director even re-
quired separately to show it—in order to intervene?1 If so, was the
Director obliged to defend the agency tribunal’s decision?2
Resolving these questions is appropriate and necessary, espe-
cially in the early years of a new statutory regime like the one in
which patent law now finds itself. In 2011, the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act undertook the largest overhaul of U.S. patent law in
nearly 60 years.3 Among the Act’s most important changes was the
continued reallocation, from the courts to the Patent Office, of the
power to review whether issued patents are valid.4 The AIA created
three new administrative adjudications with varying features and
constraints.5 The Patent Office also received the statutory authority
to intervene in appeals from these administrative adjudications,
which were to be conducted between adverse parties.6 The Patent
office had already intervened in scores of cases since the AIA’s en-
actment without the Court raising questions as to the constitution-
ality of such intervention. If the Knowles order was unusual, then, it
was because the Court had not raised the issue until now.
It is timely to inquire into the standing requirements for inter-
venors in patent cases. Just last Term, the Supreme Court in Town of
Chester v. Laroe Estates revisited the issue, partly resolving a circuit
split and offering guidance for the questions that remain.7 Moreo-
ver, questions regarding the nature and scope of the Patent Office’s
ability to intervene in appeals from administrative validity review
are important for two reasons. One is that they further inform an
ongoing Patent Office agenda to redefine the agency’s relationship
with the federal courts, particularly the Federal Circuit, as an expos-
itor and originator of patent policy. Another is that the ability of
the Patent Office to intervene as a matter of right is likely to influ-
1. Knowles Elecs., L.L.C. v. Matal, No. 16-1954 (Fed Cir. June 30, 2017) (per
curiam) (order requesting supplemental briefing), https://cdn.patentlyo.com/
media/2017/06/KnowlesOrder.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VXQ-LHK2].
2. Id.
3. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
4. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic Decision Making
in Dual PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 55–64 (2016)
(discussing administrative post-grant opposition mechanisms prior to the AIA and
under the AIA).
5. See infra Parts I.B–C.
6. 35 U.S.C. § 143 (2012).
7. 137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017).
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ence whether, and to what extent, private intervenors may also be
able to participate in the reevaluation of patent rights.
This Article explores those questions and the implications of
the various answers. Part One puts the issue of Patent Office stand-
ing into context with a descriptive account of why the AIA so dra-
matically expanded agency adjudications of patent validity, how the
new adjudicatory mechanisms work, and what constraints operate
on them. Part Two gives an analytical account of how appellate ju-
risdiction over PTAB review is currently coalescing around a hand-
ful of contested cases and how PTAB review should be understood
as a vehicle for agency policymaking. It is within this analytical ac-
count that the appellate interventions of the Patent Office must be
evaluated. Part Three offers a normative perspective on constitu-
tional requirements for the agency to intervene, drawing on recent
scholarship and Supreme Court guidance. It also argues that the
Patent Office is obliged under certain conditions to show standing
in order to intervene, and that these conditions also constrain the
substantive positions that the agency can take upon intervening.
The Article concludes with thoughts on the potential impact of
these agency-intervention principles upon private party interven-
tion on appeal.
II.
AGENCY ADJUDICATIONS OF PATENT VALIDITY
This part describes the origins and features of administrative
patent validity review under the AIA. Although courts have long
been able to reconsider whether issued patents are valid, and al-
though the Patent Office previously allowed for expert reevalua-
tion, a mix of economic, institutional, and jurisprudential concerns
about patent quality drove a push for even more powerful forms of
review. In response, the AIA created three such proceedings.
A. Concerns Over Patent Quality
Concerns over patent quality and proposals for reform make
up a rich, even dense, literature. A full survey of that literature is
well beyond the scope of this discussion. Instead, what is particu-
larly relevant and helpful for present purposes is a sense of how
academic and policy debates about patent quality during the first
decade of this century were crystallized through the administrative
validity review proceedings of the AIA. Indeed, the legislative com-
promises embodied in the Act reflect persistent themes about the
patent examination process, symptomatic litigation abuses, and
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technology- and industry-specific effects. Likewise, the compromises
also reflect a fairly stable consensus on certain economic and insti-
tutional arguments for reform, and the value of a more prominent
role for the Patent Office in implementing such reform.
As an initial matter, patent quality may refer to several aspects
of the patent right: technological, economic, and legal.8 The statu-
tory requirements for the grant of a patent right impose certain
technological standards that a prospective patentee must meet. The
Patent Office must grant patents only under certain conditions.
The invention must be sufficiently innovative as compared to the
state of the art and sufficiently well disclosed to advance the state of
the art.9 The invention must also be patent-eligible subject matter
in the first place.10 Sufficient innovation requires that an invention
be new in the sense of not having previously been described, sold,
or offered for sale in the same form that the current invention
takes.11 It also requires that an invention be nonobvious, rather
than embodying trivial combinations or extensions of existing
knowledge.12 It further requires that an invention be useful in the
sense of substantially achieving a meaningful intended purpose.13
Sufficient disclosure requires that the invention be described with
enough operational detail to enable someone to practice the inven-
tion and to identify what embodiments of the invention the inven-
8. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Remarks at the American University Washing-
ton College of Law Supreme Court Series – Commil U.S.A., L.L.C. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.
[sic] (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.pijip.org/events/commil [https://perma.cc/
9YFT-8AZ3]. In a somewhat different articulation, patent quality may be under-
stood in terms of probable validity (which corresponds with legal quality gener-
ally), clarity and faithfulness (which corresponds specifically with legal quality as to
the disclosure requirements), social utility (which corresponds largely with techno-
logical quality), and commercial success (which corresponds to some extent with
technological quality but largely with economic quality in the sense of private
value). See generally Christi J. Guerrini, Defining Patent Quality, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
3091 (2014).
9. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 899,
922–29 (2017).
10. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
11. § 102; see also Vishnubhakat, supra note 9, at 922–24 (discussing novelty). R
12. § 103; see also Vishnubhakat, supra note 9, at 924–25 (discussing R
nonobviousness).
13. § 101; see also Vishnubhakat, supra note 9, at 925–26 (discussing utility). R
Under current doctrine, the utility requirement represents a fairly low practical
bar to patentability. See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge, Road Map to Revolution? Patent-Based
Open Science, 59 ME. L. REV. 339, 356 n.90 (2007) (explaining that the utility re-
quirement is “very low and generally presents a low bar to patentability”).
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tor could reasonably be said to have possessed.14 Ensuring
compliance with these and other patentability requirements is the
basic aim of the examination process.
That an inventor must meet statutory requirements in order to
gain a monopoly ensures the economic quality of the patent, or
rather the quality of the exchange between an inventor and the
public that the grant of a patent right involves. In exchange for the
patent owner’s ability to exclude others from practicing the rele-
vant invention and thus to recover supracompetitive rents on it for
a limited period of time, the public extracts the benefit of ensuring
that only worthy inventions receive a patent.15
The question of legal quality is, in essence, whether the right
that the Patent Office has issued will survive judicial review. And it
is legal quality that the patent quality debates have primarily ad-
dressed.  This is for two interrelated reasons. The first is that legal
quality tends in part to subsume technological and economic qual-
ity. Technological quality describes the contribution that an inven-
tion makes to its relevant field. Some aspects of the requisite
contribution are fairly lenient, such as the doctrine of utility.16
Others have become more stringent in recent years, such as the
doctrine of nonobviousness following the Supreme Court’s decision
in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.17 Regardless of relative stringency,
however, an issued patent’s likelihood of surviving judicial or ad-
ministrative review depends directly on whether it has made the
necessary contribution to the state of the art. Technological quality
is thus a component of legal quality.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a); see also Vishnubhakat, supra note 9, at 926–28 (discuss- R
ing enablement, written description, and boundary notice).
15. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc.,
525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974);
see also John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439,
439–40 (2004).
16. See Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations
for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1251 (2012) (citing Utility Examination
Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263 (July 14, 1995) and ROBERT PATRICK MERGES &
JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 238 (4th
ed. 2007)). Moreover, the utility requirement does not mandate that inventions
necessarily do a better job than the prior art. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, The
Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There Limits on the United States’ Ability to Har-
monize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 17 (2004) (citing Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F.
Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568)).
17. 550 U.S. 398 (2007); see Saurabh Vishnubhakat & Arti K. Rai, When Bi-
opharma Meets Software: Bioinformatics at the Patent Office, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 205,
227–28 (2015) (discussing the doctrine of nonobviousness).
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Similarly, economic quality describes the potency of the exclu-
sionary patent right to clear the market for the patented good or
service and for any reasonable substitutes of it. Like technological
quality, this is also distinguishable from concerns about surviving
judicial review. However, the commercial success of an invention
that is attributable to its innovative qualities is, as a matter of doc-
trine, part of the inquiry into nonobviousness,18 and thus is also a
component of legal quality. Referring to patent quality and the le-
gal quality of a patent as analogous, therefore, is a reasonable short-
hand in that it that captures, to some extent, all three dimensions.
The other reason why legal quality tends to draw focus in aca-
demic and policy debates is that it is most readily observed in the
legal system. Patents may fundamentally be economic rights and
fundamentally pertain to technological advancement, but it is the
legal process that typically mediates visible disputes over a patent’s
validity, enforceability, and public or private importance. As a re-
sult, salient cases that change or reaffirm prevailing understandings
of patent law implicate legal quality, by reshaping both which pat-
ents are granted or denied and how patent validity is to be judicially
reevaluated in the future.
For the same reason, litigation is where empirical data has long
been most readily available with respect to patent enforcement, va-
lidity review, cancellations, remedies, and similar issues of inter-
est.19 Indeed, much of the early empirical work on the patent
system gave significant attention to litigated cases.20 The upshot of
this attention is that litigation trends are now widely accepted as a
symptom of the patent quality-related excesses that the patent sys-
tem’s defects can produce,21 though the widely appreciated nature
18. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) (discussing objec-
tive indicia of nonobviousness including commercial success and a long felt but
unmet need for the particular solution that the invention offers to a given
problem).
19. This is closely related, though not identical, to the economic insight that
cases selected for litigation are not necessarily representative of the larger superset
of disputes that take place in the world. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
20. E.g., Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Stylized Facts of Patent Litiga-
tion: Value, Scope and Ownership (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 6297, 1997), http://www.nber.org/papers/w6297.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZF
T-3MY7].
21. See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation Reform: The Courts, Congress,
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 279, 282 (2015); Joshua D.
Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Patent Assertion Entities and Antitrust: A Competition
Cure for a Litigation Disease?, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 501, 525 (2014); Mark A. Lemley &
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of selection effects cautions against overstating how representative
litigated cases are of the patent system as a whole.22
Patent litigation studies have offered evidence and argument
on economic questions, such as the costs generated by the lawsuits
of non-practicing entities that purchase patents solely for enforce-
ment,23 the potential for strategic litigation to create holdup and
other inefficiencies,24 and the optimal balance of risk and reward in
patent litigation.25 These studies have delved into specific empirical
questions about attributes of patents involved in litigation26 and at-
tributes of the patent examiners who issue such patents.27 They
have also explored how procedural28 and institutional29 features
shape the incidences and results of patent lawsuits.
A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2170
(2013).
22. See Alan C. Marco, The Selection Effects (and Lack Thereof) in Patent Litigation:
Evidence from Trials, 4 TOPICS ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1 (2004) (finding the pres-
ence of selection bias in patent litigation); see also Shawn P. Miller, What’s the Con-
nection Between Repeat Litigation and Patent Quality? A (Partial) Defense of the Most
Litigated Patents, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 313 (2013); Richard S. Gruner, How High Is
Too High?: Reflections on the Sources and Meaning of Claim Construction Reversal Rates at
the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981 (2010).
23. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Dis-
putes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387 (2014); James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Pri-
vate Costs of Patent Litigation, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 59 (2012).
24. See, e.g., David S. Olson, On NPEs, Holdups, and Underlying Faults in the
Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 140 (2014); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Sha-
piro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007).
25. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Litigation in the Middle: The Context of Patent-In-
fringement Injunctions, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2075 (2014); Anup Malani & Jonathan S.
Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO. L.J. 637 (2013); Ranganath
Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic Model and Proposal, 25 SANTA
CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 159 (2008).
26. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Ashtor, Michael J. Mazzeo & Samantha Zyontz, Pat-
ents at Issue: The Data Behind the Patent Troll Debate, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 957
(2014); Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283 (2011);
John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top?
The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2009).
27. See, e.g., Shine Tu, Invalidated Patents and Associated Patent Examiners, 18
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 135 (2015); Shine Tu, Patent Examiners and Litigation
Outcomes, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 507 (2014).
28. See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Rethinking Standing in Patent Challenges, 83
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 498 (2015); Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal Juris-
diction, and the Public Good, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 43 (2010); Mark D. Janis, Re-
forming Patent Validity Litigation: The “Dubious Preponderance,” 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
923 (2004).
29. See, e.g., Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67
VAND. L. REV. 375 (2014); Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Tim-
ing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161
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A second, more current body of research, however—and one
that provides a better index of problems with the legal quality of
patents—has focused on patent examination rather than litigation.
Where litigation reflects symptoms, data on patent examination
process reveals underlying pathologies. Contemporary research
into patent quality has extensively explored how Patent Office ex-
amination actually proceeds, what incentives and disincentives mo-
tivate different actors in the process, and where potential reforms
may lie. This research rests on two main foundations. One is work
from industrial organization microeconomics about the classifica-
tion of patents,30 the use of backward- and forward-citation net-
works as proxies for patent examination quality and patent value,31
and inferences about innovating activity from patenting trends.32
The other is the development and dissemination, starting in early
2010, of large and highly-documented datasets about patent exami-
nation, examiner actions, post-issuance sales and transfers, renew-
als, and a large number of bibliographic attributes.33 This mix of
methodological tools and detailed data has now produced a rich
U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (2013); Paul Morgan & Bruce Stoner, Reexamination vs. Litiga-
tion—Making Intelligent Decisions in Challenging Patent Validity, 86 J. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFF. SOC’Y 441 (2004).
30. See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER
Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8498, 2001), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w8498.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXR9-JAS8].
31. See, e.g., id.; Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, Market
Value and Patent Citations, 36 RAND J. ECON. 16 (2005); Adam B. Jaffe, Manuel
Trajtenberg & Michael S. Fogarty, Knowledge Spillovers and Patent Citations: Evidence
from a Survey of Inventors, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 215 (2000); Adam B. Jaffe, Manuel
Trajtenberg & Rebecca Henderson, Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as
Evidenced by Patent Citations, 108 Q.J. ECON. 577 (1993); Manuel Trajtenberg, A
Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value of Innovations, 21 RAND J. ECON.
172 (1990).
32. See, e.g., Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, The Quality of Ideas: Mea-
suring Innovation with Multiple Indicators (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7345, 1999), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7345.pdf [https://perma
.cc/A8MC-3SGS]; Rebecca Henderson, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, Uni-
versities as a Source of Commercial Technology: A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting,
1965–1988, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 119 (1998); Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as
Economic Indicators: A Survey, 28 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1661 (1990); Zvi Griliches,
Ariel Pakes & Bronwyn H. Hall, The Value of Patents as Indicators of Inventive Activity,
in ECONOMIC POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE 97 (Partha Dasgupta &
Paul Stoneman eds., 1987).
33. See generally Office of the Chief Economist, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/organizational-offices/office-policy-and-interna
tional-affairs/office-chief-economist [https://www.perma.cc/ASC2-4J68].
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literature on patent examination process that rivals that on
litigation.
For example, studies of the patent examination process have
addressed important economic questions, such as notice-related ex-
ternalities that can arise from lenient or imprecise demarcation of
patent rights,34 asymmetries that favor granting patents by provid-
ing appellate review where the right may be improperly denied but
not where the right may be improperly granted,35 and the role of
search costs in evaluating the increasing complexity of the patent
landscape that examination must navigate.36 These studies have
made much empirical progress toward illuminating both individual
events during patent examination and overall trajectories that pat-
ent applications take through the process.37 They have also put for-
ward a raft of proposals to reform the processes of the Patent
Office, such as imposing ex post financial consequences for suc-
ceeding or failing to secure a patent,38 reversing the statutory pre-
sumption that patents must be granted absent a showing of
unpatentability (so that the patent examiner, not the applicant,
bears the burden),39 and improving the quality of information that
the Patent Office receives during examination.40
34. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Exter-
nalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2013).
35. See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, Patent Asymmetries, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 963
(2016); Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand
Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 385 (2011); Jonathan Masur, Patent
Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470 (2011).
36. See, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, The Reciprocity of Search, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1
(2013) (discussing patent search costs and introducing a cost-minimizing system
design); Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 289 (2012); Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Liability Rules as Search
Rules, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 187 (2011); Jeffrey M. Kuhn, Information Overload at the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Reframing the Duty of Disclosure in Patent Law as a
Search and Filter Problem, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 90 (2011).
37. See, e.g., Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to
Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents? Evidence from
Microlevel Application Data, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 550 (2017); Michael D. Frakes &
Melissa F. Wasserman, Patent Office Cohorts, 65 DUKE L.J. 1601 (2016); Michael D.
Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too
Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613 (2015);
Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J.
181 (2008).
38. See, e.g., Neel U. Sukhatme, “Loser Pays” in Patent Examination, 54 HOUS. L.
REV. 165 (2016).
39. See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV.
990 (2013).
40. See, e.g., Susan Walmsley Graf, Improving Patent Quality Through Identifica-
tion of Relevant Prior Art: Approaches to Increase Information Flow to the Patent Office, 11
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The patent quality reform agenda that was ultimately enacted
in the AIA’s system of administrative review is best understood as an
effort to correct patent quality problems that the examination pro-
cess did not capture—indeed, was perhaps incapable of capturing
up front41—and called for a second look. That the most visible
symptoms of these problems appeared in the courts was particularly
apt because the traditional means for revealing and correcting Pat-
ent Office examination errors had also been court litigation.42
Starting in the early 1980s, the virtually exclusive reliance on judi-
cial correction began to soften in favor of administrative reevalua-
tion by the Patent Office itself.43 This administrative system for
validity review existed in parallel with litigation in the Article III
courts, but was expressly intended to be a faster, cheaper, and more
accurate substitute for lay judges and juries.44 The key rationale
given for this reallocation of power over patent validity, away from
courts and into the agency, was expertise—with the scientific details
of invention and with the doctrinal details of patent law—in order
to minimize cost, delay, and inaccuracy.45
The updated and invigorated system of administrative patent
validity review that the AIA put in place shares these features. AIA
proceedings, too, exist in parallel with federal court litigation, al-
beit with some caveats. For example, AIA proceedings, unlike ear-
lier reexaminations, have a much more meaningful border between
the Patent Office and the courts as substitutes for each other.46 This
border is the result of several structural features, including stronger
estoppel provisions and statutory time bars for leaving court and
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 495 (2007); Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer to Patent”: Collective
Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (2006); Kevin
Mack, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent Quality: Cleansing Unclean
Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147 (2006).
41. For a discussion of post-grant validity review as not just the only feasible
means of patent error-correction but also the more preferable means, see Mark A.
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001). But see
Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ignorance
in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219 (2004) (replying to Lemley).
42. Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 4, at 51. R
43. Id. at 51–55 (discussing administrative error-correction prior to the AIA).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 53–54. But see Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Disguised Patent Policymaking,
104 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming) (arguing that the history and structure of adminis-
trative patent validity review reveals a desire for—or at least a tendency to intro-
duce—political considerations in addition to expertise when resolving questions of
patent validity).
46. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Porous Court-Agency Border in Patent Law, 51
AKRON L. REV. 915 (2018).
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going to the agency.47 This court-agency border, in turn, invites fo-
rum shopping and other strategic behavior by litigants.48
Still, like earlier administrative adjudications, proceedings
under the AIA benefit from technical expertise. The administrative
patent judges who sit on the PTAB are, in fact, not traditional ad-
ministrative law judges but rather are hired specifically to serve in
the Patent Office and, by statute, must be “persons of competent
legal knowledge and scientific ability” in order to qualify for service
on the PTAB.49 These and other features of the PTAB process do
much to frame and explain the Patent Office’s observed intervenor
activity.  Moreover, although the origins of this intervention lie in
reforms motivated by patent quality, the resulting transformation of
court-agency relations in the patent system are part of a larger struc-
tural campaign toward a more independent Patent Office.
B. Features of Validity Review in the PTAB
The desire for expertise—with its expected attendant benefits
of lower cost, faster resolution, and greater accuracy in decision-
making—is merely the starting point for the PTAB’s design. The
AIA introduced three new adjudicatory proceedings: inter partes
review,50 covered business method review,51 and post-grant
review.52
All three types of proceedings are concerned essentially with
the same problem—correcting patent examination errors—and
function in generally the same way.53 First is the petition phase,
47. See id. The issue of estoppel from an AIA proceeding upon later court
litigation, however, remains somewhat murky. The Federal Circuit addressed the
issue in Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. Automated Creel Systems, Inc., 817 F.3d 1293
(Fed. Cir. 2016). However, as Judge Reyna’s concurring opinion in that case
pointed out, estoppel effects are not for the PTAB, the Patent Office, or the Fed-
eral Circuit itself to decide in the first instance, but rather by the U.S. district
courts or the International Trade Commission—upon which estoppel actually op-
erates. Id. at 1305 (Reyna, J., concurring).
48. See Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 4, at 64–77 (discussing strategic R
litigant behavior in employing federal-court litigation and administrative
adjudication).
49. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012).
50. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(a), 125 Stat.
284, 299–305 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319 (2012)).
51. § 18, 125 Stat. at 329–31.
52. § 6(d), 125 Stat. at 305–11 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329
(2012)).
53. The Patent Office has published a chart helpfully summarizing and com-
paring salient features of the AIA proceedings. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IPR, PGR, AND CBM (2014), https://www.uspto.gov/
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identifying a granted patent that appears not to satisfy the require-
ments for patentability. Next is the proceeding itself, which reevalu-
ates the patent in light of relevant technical and other evidence.
The conclusion is the PTAB’s judgment, canceling those patent
claims that, in the agency’s view, should not have been granted. All
cases begin with a petition brought by a third party and proceed
only where there is enough likelihood of eventual success.54 Final
orders of the PTAB in AIA proceedings are appealable to the Fed-
eral Circuit.55 Beneath these general similarities, however, lie im-
portant differences that litigants must also take into account.
For example, the inter partes and covered business method re-
views are available for patents without regard to when they were
issued, including prior to the AIA’s passage.56 Post-grant review is
available only for patents issued under post-AIA rules and within
the first nine months of issuance.57 Meanwhile, inter partes review
and post-grant review proceedings are available as to all patents
without regard to technology, whereas covered business method re-
view is available only as to patents that cover non-technological fi-
nancial products or services.58 As to grounds for challenging
validity, inter partes review allows the Patent Office to revisit only
novelty and nonobviousness and admits only certain evidence about
prior inventions, but post-grant review and covered business
method review can revisit virtually all major patentability require-
ments and entertain a much greater scope of prior evidence.59
Notwithstanding these differences, the AIA proceedings also
have key similarities, especially with regard to who can request re-
view, how the PTAB selects its cases, what standards the PTAB uses
in its adjudications, and what aspects of the PTAB’s decisions are
subject to judicial review. In inter partes review and post-grant re-
view, anyone other than the patent owner may challenge the valid-
ity of a patent without meeting the standing requirement to
challenge a patent in an Article III court—indeed, without meeting
sites/default/files/ip/boards/bpai/aia_trial_comparison_chart.pptx [https://
www.perma.cc/N5PU-9WHG].
54. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100–.123, .200–.224, .300–.304 (2017) (respectively ad-
dressing inter partes review, post-grant review, and covered business method
review).
55. 35 U.S.C. §§ 319, 329, 141(c) (2012).
56. § 311(c); § 6(c)(2)(A), 125 Stat. at 304; § 18(a)(2), 125 Stat. at 330.
57. § 321(c); § 6(f)(2)(A), 125 Stat. at 311.
58. §§ 311, 321; § 6(c)(2)(A), 125 Stat. at 304; § 6(f)(2)(A), 125 Stat. at 311;
§ 18(a)(2), 125 Stat. at 330; § 18(d)(1), 125 Stat. at 331.
59. See §§ 311(b), 321(b); § 18(a)(1)(C), 125 Stat. at 330; 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.304(b)(2).
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any standing requirement at all.60 In all three types of proceedings,
the PTAB accepts cases if preliminary review suggests that they are
sufficiently likely to succeed on the merits.61
As to adjudicatory standards, in all three types of proceedings,
the PTAB in construing and evaluating the scope of the patent gives
each patent claim its “broadest reasonable construction.”62 This in-
terpretive method is longstanding in initial patent examination, but
it is different from the interpretive method used by federal courts
for already-issued patents.63 Given the difference, a patent con-
strued under the PTAB method is, at the margin, more likely to be
read broadly and consequently more likely to be invalidated than if
the same patent were construed under ordinary district court meth-
ods.64 Likewise, in all three proceedings, the burden for proving
patent invalidity is a preponderance of the evidence65 whereas the
corresponding burden in a court proceeding is higher: to prove
invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.66
Finally, with regard to judicial supervision of the PTAB, only
the final written decision regarding the validity (or not) of patent
claims is subject to judicial review.67 The initial determination
whether to accept the case for adjudication, however, is not appeal-
60. §§ 311(a), 321(a); Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 4, at 55. Cov- R
ered business method reviews, however, cannot be filed preemptively but only in
response to a district-court lawsuit alleging infringement of the patent in question.
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 18(a)(1)(B), 125 Stat. 284,
330 (2011).
61. §§ 314(a), 324(a). In the case of covered business method review and
post-grant review, review may also available where “the petition raises a novel or
unsettled legal question that is important to other patents or patent applications.”
§ 324(b).
62. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b), 42.200(b), 42.300(b).
63. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., L.L.C. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016).
64. Nora Xu, AIA Proceedings: A Prescription for Accelerating the Availability of Ge-
neric Drugs, 66 EMORY L.J. 1007, 1024 (2017); Robert MacWright, Three Years After
the America Invents Act: Practical Effects on University Tech Transfer, 52 LES NOUVELLES
68, 70–71 (2017); Jason Mock, Post-Grant Proceedings at the USPTO and the Rising
Tide of Federal Circuit Appeals, 25 FED. CIR. B.J. 15, 25 (2015). The reason for this, in
brief, is that when understanding a patented invention broadly, one is more likely
to tread on the body of prior knowledge in the field. This treading upon prior
knowledge is what patent examination is supposed to guard against, and so it is
grounds for invalidating the patent. Conversely, when an invention is understood
narrowly, with clear differentiation between the invention and the prior art, the
patent is more likely to survive review. Id.
65. §§ 316(e), 326(e).
66. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i, Ltd. P’ship., 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011).
67. §§ 319, 329, 141(c).
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able.68 As discussed below, this immunity from judicial review is
strong—unusually strong by administrative law standards—and has
important consequences for Patent Office incentives to exercise in-
tervenor power.69 Similarly, though none of these proceedings by
itself is capable of fully supplanting federal courts in reviewing pat-
ent validity, there is largely a consensus that they are an attractive
alternative for those challenging patent validity.70 The background
purpose of challenging patent validity—to resolve concerns about
patent quality more effectively—has specific implications for partic-
ipation in PTAB review. These participatory constraints, in turn also
influence Patent Office incentives to exercise intervenor power.
C. Participatory Constraints on PTAB Review
In crafting the AIA, Congress took note of calls for greater
public input into questions of patent validity. Prior to the AIA’s en-
actment, administrative reevaluations were not especially trial-like
in the sense of robust adversarial presentation of argument and evi-
dence—instead, they were reexaminations that placed the patent
owner back in the posture of arguing with a patent examiner about
the patentability of the given invention.71 Ex parte reexaminations,
for example, had no third-party input beyond the initial request,
and, according to USPTO statistics, were initiated in 29 percent of
cases by the patent owners themselves.72 Even inter partes reexami-
nations, the most immediate precursor to the AIA proceedings,
largely lay unused; this was due to average case pendencies in ex-
cess of three years followed by internal Patent Office review and
due to disproportionately strong estoppel provisions.73 The error-
correction of patent validity through the courts, meanwhile, was
strongly constrained by standing requirements. In fact, the Federal
Circuit’s jurisprudence on standing was often criticized as being too
68. §§ 314(d), 324(e).
69. See infra Part III.B.1.
70. See, e.g., Nichole M. Valeyko & Maegan A. Fuller, The PTAB’s Influence of the
Biotechnology and Pharma Industries, 307 N.J. LAW. MAG. 65, 65 (2017); Phong D.
Nguyen, Changes to Patent Law Practices Under the America Invents Act, ASPATORE, 2013
WL 6683687, at *4 (Nov. 2013); Robert L. Stoll, Patently Practical Advice: The Impact
of Recent Supreme Court and Federal Circuit Cases on Patent Law and How They Affect the
Advice We Give Our Clients, ASPATORE, 2012 WL 6636451, at *12 (Nov. 2012).
71. Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 4, at 55–58. R
72. Id. at 56–57 (citing U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, Ex parte Reexami-
nation Filing Data—September 30, 2014, http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/ex_parte_historical_stats_roll_up.pdf [https://perma.cc/758D-
5S5X]).
73. Id. at 57–58.
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strict to allow otherwise desirable challenges to patent validity
through suits for declaratory judgment of invalidity.74
Scholars have also argued as a matter of public administrative
process that the Patent Office should treat patent rights more ex-
plicitly as public rights through more formally participatory and de-
liberative decision-making structures.75 A particularly nuanced
middle ground in this literature is a set of proposals to allocate
power to the Patent Office over its findings of relevant technical
and scientific facts (if not determinations of law or policy)76 and to
develop patent policy not solely in the Patent Office but with more
input and coherence across a variety of relevant executive-branch
agencies.77 These approaches would altogether sidestep the par-
ticipatory constraints of litigation and render moot the par-
ticipatory defects of reexamination. With a few exceptions,
however, they remain largely unimplemented in patent law.
Instead, the preferred approach of Congress in the AIA was to
throw open the doors of the Patent Office to would-be patent valid-
ity challengers. Nevertheless, for longstanding reasons of constitu-
tional separation of powers, Congress was obliged to afford judicial
review over the Patent Office’s adjudications78—and did so.79 This
naturally raised the question of what to do with a party that would
not originally have possessed standing to bring a patent validity
challenge in the courts, brought an administrative validity chal-
lenge in the Patent Office instead, and lost in the agency. Would
such a party be permitted, constitutionally, to seek judicial review?
Current Federal Circuit precedent holds that an unsuccessful chal-
lenger in administrative patent validity review must still meet stand-
74. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Walrath, Expanding Standing in Patent Declaratory Judg-
ment Actions to Better Air Public Policy Considerations, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 476 (2013);
Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41 (2012).
75. See, e.g., Kali N. Murray, Rules for Radicals: A Politics of Patent Law, 14 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 63 (2006); James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environ-
mentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1997).
76. See Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907 (2004).
77. Rai, supra note 16; see also Tejas N. Narechania, Patent Conflicts, 103 GEO. R
L.J. 1483 (2015).
78. Greg Reilly, The Constitutionality of Administrative Patent Cancellation, 23
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 377, 416–17 (2017).
79. §§ 319, 329. This judicial review has, of course, been governed by the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act and so is relatively more deferential on issues of fact
than review over district court findings. Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Changing Standards of
Review, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 205, 214 n.24 (2016).
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ing requirements in order to appeal.80 The adverse agency decision
does not, in itself, create an injury sufficient to create standing.81
The Federal Circuit’s analysis suggests instead that the standing in-
quiry for an appeal of this sort would simply revert to the same
standing inquiry that would govern a district-court lawsuit for de-
claratory judgment of patent invalidity.82 As a result, it is entirely
possible that a party could unsuccessfully challenge a patent in in-
ter partes review, covered business method review, or post-grant re-
view and then be unable to seek review in the Federal Circuit.
The reverse, however, is apparently not true. A different recent
decision of the Federal Circuit holds that a successful challenger in
administrative PTAB review need not show standing to defend its
victory.83 In this posture, the appellee is not “the party invoking
judicial review”—that party is the unsuccessful patent owner, who
can plainly show “an alteration of tangible legal rights . . . that is
sufficiently distinct and palpable to confer standing under Article
III.”84 With a justiciable case or controversy thus established, said
the Federal Circuit, the appellee bears no added burden to demon-
strate standing.85 Of course, a challenger-appellee may still decline
for its own reasons to appear in the appeal and defend its victory.
In both cases—an unsuccessful patent validity challenger that
cannot appeal and a successful patent validity challenger that will
not appear in the appeal—the Patent Office has an incentive to
intervene in the appeal. This incentive lies in the stare decisis effect
that the Federal Circuit’s decision may carry and in the potential
changes to patent law and policy that may result. The AIA has given
the Patent Office significant new interests in these questions.
80. See Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258
(Fed. Cir. 2014).
81. Id. at 1261–62. The issue is now again before the Federal Circuit in a
currently pending case, Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 17-
1694 (Fed. Cir. argued Dec. 5, 2017) http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/node/22675
[https://perma.cc/3HLK-WDBH].
82. See Consumer Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1261 (giving weight to the lack of any
facts “that could form the basis for an infringement claim”—the traditionally suffi-
cient condition for establishing an injury-in-fact in cases seeking declaratory judg-
ment of patent invalidity).
83. Pers. Audio, L.L.C. v. Elec. Frontier Found., 867 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
84. Id. at 1250 (citing Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 121, 123 (2003)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
85. Id.
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III.
EVOLVING JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF
PATENT VALIDITY
To appreciate fully the policy interests that the Patent Office
now has in the judicial reshaping of patent law, it is useful to con-
sider how dramatically the judicial role has changed in resolving
questions of patent validity. This part discusses that change, particu-
larly in the context of appellate jurisdiction over PTAB review. The
upshot is that PTAB review now represents a potent vehicle for Pat-
ent Office policymaking. Given the agency’s expansive positions in
other areas related to administrative patent validity review, exercis-
ing intervenor power is a logical and natural part of the broader
Patent Office campaign of policymaking.
A. Federal Circuit Primacy
Prior to the AIA’s enactment, the Federal Circuit’s primacy in
patent law was difficult to overstate. For issued patents, the court
had exclusive jurisdiction in all patent appeals from the federal dis-
trict courts, be they about infringement or declaratory judgment.86
The same was true of ex parte and inter partes reexamination,
which were appealable first, internally, within the Patent Office87
and then exclusively to the Federal Circuit.88 Likewise, for patent
applications, the court had exclusive jurisdiction in all appeals
where the agency had denied the inventor’s application.89
The Federal Circuit’s supervision was pervasive. Whether on di-
rect appeal of the agency’s denial of an application or in a collat-
eral review, through district-court litigation, of the agency’s grant of
a patent, the Federal Circuit’s review was de novo, giving no defer-
ence to Patent Office interpretations of substantive patent law.90
This was a marked departure from ordinary principles of adminis-
trative law, under which an agency’s interpretations of a statute that
it administers should receive either strong deference under the
Chevron doctrine91 or somewhat weaker deference under the Skid-
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006).
87. 35 U.S.C. §§ 306, 315(b), 134(c).
88. § 141.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
90. See, e.g., In re DBC, 545 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008); DH Tech., Inc. v.
Synergystex Int’l, Inc., 154 F.3d 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Portola Packag-
ing, Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Kulling, 897 F.2d 1147, 1149
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
91. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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more doctrine92 depending on the legal authoritativeness of the
agency interpretation or the formality with which it was devel-
oped.93 The Federal Circuit’s patent exceptionalism on this key ad-
ministrative law issue was also the subject of scholarly criticism.94
Adding to this intrusive scope of review was the Federal Circuit’s
conclusion that the Patent Office lacks any general substantive
rulemaking authority.95 Instead, the agency has the authority to
promulgate rules only on procedural issues and on enumerated
substantive issues.96 Just as the agency’s backward-looking adjudica-
tions were a rather poor means for advancing a Patent Office policy
agenda, the agency’s forward-looking rulemaking was equally inef-
fectual in view of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence.
The AIA was a mixed reform in this regard. It did not change
the state of affairs surrounding substantive rulemaking authority,97
which may be for the best.98 What the Act did change was adjudica-
tion. Administrative trials under the inter partes review, covered
business method review, and post-grant review statutes all do ap-
pear to meet the standards for formality and rigor that suggest that
Congress, in the AIA, intended the agency to “speak with the force
92. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
93. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). The particular con-
tours of Chevron versus Skidmore deference have been the subject of extensive de-
bate. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006);
Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, Recent Decisions of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347
(2003); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of
Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill,
The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L.
REV. 807 (2002).
94. See, e.g., Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron
Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959 (2013); Stuart Minor Benjamin &
Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administra-
tive Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269 (2007).
95. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (dis-
cussing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979)).
96. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1282 (Fed. Cir.
2005); see also Benjamin & Rai, supra note 94, at 297–98. R
97. The “specific powers” provision of the Patent Act remains unchanged and
still limits the power of the Office to “establish regulations, not inconsistent with
law, which shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 2(b)(2)(A) (2012) (emphasis added). Notably, earlier versions of the legislation
did propose substantive rulemaking authority for the agency. Patent Reform Act of
2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 11.
98. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 94, at 272 n.13 (“[G]iven the tendency of R
rulemaking to be particularly subject to interest group pressures . . . the attractive-
ness of substantive rulemaking authority is unclear.” (internal citations omitted)).
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of law”99 through its adjudications.100 Curiously and notably, how-
ever, the Patent Office thus far has declined to ask for Chevron def-
erence with regard to core patentability requirements,101 deference
to which it may be entitled either based on current agency practice
or with relatively easy internal changes.102
Instead, the Patent Office has asserted itself in other ways. One
approach has been to take a broad view of the nonappealability pro-
visions of the inter partes, covered business method, and post-grant
review statutes.103 A second approach—more brazen but less wide-
spread, at least so far—has been to politicize the PTAB’s adjudica-
tions in order to reach specific outcomes in accordance with the
preferences of the political leadership of the Patent Office. Both of
these approaches are highly contested and are the subject of judi-
cial concern104 as well as academic criticism.105
B. PTAB Review as Policymaking
Both of these approaches are also best understood as a plat-
form for policymaking by the Patent Office. Reading the AIA’s
nonappealability provisions broadly makes the Patent Office less an-
swerable to the Federal Circuit and opens the door to greater politi-
99. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
100. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era of
Patent Stare Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1582–83 (2016); Wasserman, supra note 94, R
at 1977.
101. The core patentability conditions are the eligibility-, innovation-, and dis-
closure-related requirements that inventions must satisfy in order to merit patent
protection. See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text. R
102. Cf. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 100, at 1581–90 (arguing that in such R
cases, the Patent Office would likely be entitled to Chevron deference). Benjamin &
Rai suggest that the agency’s refusal to seek Chevron deference is driven by political
cost and by anticipated hostility from the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court, or
both. Id. at 1590.
103. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. R
104. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., 868
F.3d 1013, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Dyk, J., concurring) (expressing concern that
“[w]hile we recognize the importance of achieving uniformity in PTO decisions,
we question whether the practice of expanding panels where the PTO is dissatis-
fied with a panel’s earlier decision is the appropriate mechanism of achieving the
desired uniformity”); Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d
1293, 1302–05 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna, J., concurring) (expressing concern with
the Patent Office’s “claim to unchecked discretionary authority” and its refusal to
provide reasoned bases for its decisions even where those decisions may be nonap-
pealable by statute).
105. The discussion that follows summarizes a more fully theorized critique of
the increasingly political style of decision-making that contemporary PTAB prac-
tice reflects. See Vishnubhakat, supra note 45. R
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cal independence for the agency. Politicizing PTAB adjudication in
order to reach particular outcomes in individual cases, meanwhile,
can more directly implement policy preferences about how the pat-
ent laws should apply to certain technology areas, certain indus-
tries, certain types of litigants, and so on.
1. Leveraging Nonappealability
To advance the expansive view of nonappealability, the Patent
Office takes advantage of an efficiency measure that Congress has
included in each administrative adjudication that it has enacted.
For ex parte and inter partes reexaminations, anyone requesting
review had to show that a “substantial new question of patentability”
existed as to the patent in question.106 For inter partes reviews, the
petitioner must show a “reasonable likelihood” of prevailing as to at
least one of the challenged patent claims.107 And for covered busi-
ness method and post-grant reviews, the petitioner must show that
it is “more likely than not” that at least one of the challenged patent
claims is, indeed, unpatentable.108 These determinations, in turn,
were final and nonappealable for ex parte109 and inter partes reex-
amination110 just as they now are for AIA proceedings.111
These likelihood-of-success standards were intended to pro-
mote efficiency by gauging credibility up front and guarding
against the waste of agency time and resources with frivolous chal-
lenges. Similarly, immunizing these initial determinations from ju-
dicial review promotes efficiency by sparing the agency from
constantly defending the screening decisions that it makes in the
hundreds or even thousands of petitions that come before it.112
106. 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2006); MPEP § 2216 (8th ed. Rev. 7, July 2008); 35
U.S.C. § 312(a); MPEP § 2616.
107. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012).
108. § 324(a).
109. § 303(c) (1982); id. § 303(c) (2000); id. § 303(c) (2006); id. § 303(c)
(2012).
110. § 312(c) (2000); id. § 312(c) (2006); id. § 312(c) (Supp. V 2012).
111. §§ 314(d), 324(e) (2012).
112. This is not to say that the lack of judicial review has no efficiency costs. A
lack of judicial correction may, for example, bring about unprincipled or unac-
countable decision-making by the agency and generate inefficiency in the longer
term. See, e.g., Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Non-Doctrine of Redundancy, 33 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. (forthcoming). The conclusion of Congress, however, appears to have
been that the benefits from committing these decisions to agency discretion would
likely outweigh the costs.
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Some judicial review must remain, of course, to ensure ac-
countability in the agency.113 Accordingly, appellate jurisdiction re-
mains over the eventual adjudications that the PTAB makes on the
merits of each case.114 Faced with this bifurcated structure—where
initial screening decisions are unreviewable but merits adjudica-
tions are reviewable—an agency whose aim is to assert itself against
a supervising court has self-evident incentive to characterize issues
as screening-related rather than adjudication-related. The Patent
Office has already taken this approach in at least four major con-
texts: three pertaining to inter partes review and a fourth, discussed
in the next section, pertaining to covered business method review.
In one instance, the agency defended its practice in the Supreme
Court and won.115 In the second, the agency just lost in the en banc
Federal Circuit.116 In the third, the agency awaits a decision by the
Supreme Court yet again.117 In the fourth, the Federal Circuit has
consistently held against the Patent Office position from the
start.118
The first context is the requirement that inter partes review
petitions must plead their arguments “with particularity,” or else
the petition may not be considered.119 In 2012, petitioner Garmin
International challenged the validity of a patent held by Cuozzo
Speed Technologies.120 Based on its initial screening, the PTAB
granted review on certain of the patent’s claims and found them
invalid on the merits.121 Cuozzo appealed to the Federal Circuit,
arguing that the PTAB was wrong to grant review because Garmin’s
petition had not been pled with the requisite particularity.122 The
Supreme Court agreed with the Patent Office that the particularity
of pleading, though it may implicate adjudication-related questions
113. This is administrative law’s familiar presumption in favor of judicial re-
view when construing statutes, including statutes that purport to limit or preclude
review. Cuozzo Speed Techs., L.L.C. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016).
114. §§ 319, 329.
115. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. 2131.
116. Wi-Fi One, L.L.C. v. Broadcom Corp., 837 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
117. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, L.L.C., 825 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
118. See, e.g., Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2015); SightSound Techs., L.L.C. v. Apple, Inc., 809 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Blue Calypso, L.L.C. v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
119. § 312(a)(3).
120. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2138.
121. Id. at 2138–39.
122. Id. at 2139. Cuozzo also argued, unsuccessfully, that the nonappealability
provision of the inter partes review statute is a bar only to interlocutory review, not
to all review of PTAB screening decisions. Id. at 2140.
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about quality or sufficiency of evidence, means little more than that
the petition deserves review—a quintessentially screening-related
issue.123
The second context is the requirement that a PTAB petitioner
that has previously been sued in U.S. district court for infringing a
patent must seek inter partes review on the relevant patent within
one year, or else the inter partes review may not be instituted.124 In
2013, Broadcom Corp. challenged the validity of a patent held by
Wi-Fi One.125 Wi-Fi argued that Broadcom’s challenge was barred
because Broadcom was in privity with entities whom Wi-Fi had sued
more than one year earlier in U.S. district court for infringing the
same patent.126 The PTAB rejected Wi-Fi’s arguments, granted re-
view, and found certain of the patent’s claims invalid on the mer-
its.127 Wi-Fi appealed to the Federal Circuit and argued that the
PTAB acted outside its authority by granting the petition of a statu-
torily time-barred party.128 On en banc rehearing, the Patent Office
cast the issue as one of initial screening, not adjudication—just as it
had in Cuozzo—and therefore as unreviewable.129 The potential of
the case to define the reach of Cuozzo attracted a good deal of ami-
cus briefing130 and commentary.131 The en banc majority rejected
the Patent Office position, concluding that applications of the one-
year time remain reviewable.132
123. Id. at 2141–42.
124. § 315(b). The one-year bar attaches not only to the petitioner but also to
any of its privies or real parties in interest. Id.
125. Wi-Fi One, L.L.C. v. Broadcom Corp., 837 F.3d 1329, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
2016), vacated on reh’g en banc, 851 F.3d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2017), on reh’g en banc, 878
F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1332–33.
128. Id. at 1333.
129. En Banc Brief for Intervenor Michelle K. Lee, Director, United States
Patent and Trademark Office at 9, Wi-Fi One, L.L.C. v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Nos. 15-1944, 15-1945, 15-1946), 2017 WL 1132930, at *9
(arguing that “[s]ection 315(b) exemplifies the kind of institution-specific deter-
mination for which Congress intended to foreclose appeals”).
130. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Patent and Administrative
Law in Support of Neither Party, Wi-Fi One, L.L.C. v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Nos. 15-1944, 15-1945, 15-1946), 2017 U.S. Fed. Cir. Briefs
LEXIS 29.
131. See, e.g., Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Court-Agency Allocations of Power and the
Limits of Cuozzo, PATENTLY-O (May 5, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/
05/agency-allocations-limits.html [https://perma.cc/78GD-HTWM].
132. Wi-Fi One, L.L.C. v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en
banc).
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The third context is the requirement that the PTAB, where re-
view is granted and not dismissed, must issue a final written deci-
sion addressing the merits of “any patent claim challenged by the
petitioner.”133 Unlike the particularity requirement and the one-
year time bar, this requirement tends to disadvantage the chal-
lenger rather than the patent owner. In 2014, SAS Institute chal-
lenged the validity of 16 claims in a patent held by
ComplementSoft.134 The PTAB granted review on nine of the
claims but denied review on the seven others.135 The PTAB’s final
written decision addressed the merits only of the patent claims on
which the PTAB granted review—not on all the claims “challenged
by the petitioner” in the original petition.136 The Patent Office ar-
gued in the Supreme Court, as it had in the Federal Circuit below
as intervenor, that the statutory obligation regarding completeness
in the final written decision is constrained by the initial PTAB
screening.137 Understood in light of that screening power, said the
Patent Office, the statute that governs final written decision need
address only the claims on which the PTAB actually granted
review.138
This trilogy of cases reveals a progression of increasingly bold
agency claims about what should be considered screening-related
and judicially unreviewable. Cuozzo was about the necessary quali-
ties of the petition itself, and the argument that the issue was prima-
rily about screening rather than adjudication was plausible even if it
sometimes leads to disagreeable results. Wi-Fi One, in turn, is a case
about the court-agency allocation of power to decide patent validity
cases, an allocation that rests in significant part on the one-year
time bar for inter partes review.139 The decision to enforce the time
bar is not primarily about the necessary qualities of the petition but
rather about extrinsic conditions that bear on the PTAB’s authority
to proceed. This is at least a closer case than Cuozzo and likely con-
133. § 318(a). The provision also requires the decision to address any new
claims that the patent owner may have added during the proceeding. Id.
134. SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, L.L.C., 825 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2016), cert. granted sub nom. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Lee, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (2017).
135. Id. The PTAB’s practice of granting-in-part and denying-in-part rests on
a Patent Office rule, 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (2017), that interprets 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)
to permit this practice.
136. SAS Inst., 825 F.3d at 1352.
137. Brief for the Federal Respondent at 13–14, SAS Inst., Inc. v. Matal, No.
16-969 (U.S. Sept. 5, 2017), 2017 WL 3948437, at *13–14.
138. Id.
139. See Vishnubhakat, supra note 46; Vishnubhakat, supra note 131. R
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trary to Cuozzo.140 Meanwhile, SAS Institute is about adjudication-re-
lated obligations that Congress imposed on the PTAB.
Undoubtedly, one can recast the issue in terms of initial screening
power and defend the agency’s practice on that basis, but this over-
all line of argument suggests a marked preference on the part of
the Patent Office for resisting judicial review of the PTAB where
possible.
2. Defining Covered Business Method Patents
An interesting postscript to this nonappealability-based ap-
proach to policy also bears mention. The trilogy of Cuozzo, Wi-Fi
One, and SAS Institute all pertain to inter partes review, though they
do directly affect the other AIA proceedings given the identical or
highly similar provisions that govern nonappealable screening, es-
toppel, and other structural features in all three review mecha-
nisms. Yet the covered business method statute includes an
additional and express policymaking provision. Covered business
method review is available only for patents that satisfy the AIA’s def-
inition of an eligible patent.141 The enabling statutory provision au-
thorizes and commands the Director to promulgate rules that
elaborate on this definition.142
From the start, the Patent Office has argued that PTAB deter-
minations of whether patents satisfy the definition are nonappeala-
ble—just as PTAB determinations of whether to grant review as to
the validity of those patents is nonappealable. The agency advanced
this argument in multiple cases, including Versata v. SAP,143 Sight-
Sound v. Apple,144 and Blue Calypso v. Groupon.145 A panel of the Fed-
eral Circuit first ruled against the Patent Office in Versata, agreeing
that the determination of whether to grant review is immune from
140. The en banc decision in Wi-Fi supports this view, concluding in a 9–4
majority that applications of the one-year time bar are judicially reviewable even in
light of the Cuozzo decision. Wi-Fi One, L.L.C. v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364,
1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
141. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(d)(1), 125
Stat. 284, 331 (2011).
142. § 18(d)(2).
143. Brief for the Intervenor, Director of the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office at 16–17, Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1194), 2014 WL 1878618, at *16–17.
144. Brief for the Intervenor, Director of the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office at 26–27, SightSound Techs., L.L.C. v. Apple, Inc., 809 F.3d 1307
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (Nos. 15-1159, 15-1160), 2015 WL 1814625, at *26–27.
145. Brief for Intervenor, Director of the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office at 16–17, Blue Calypso, L.L.C. v. Groupon, Inc., 815 F.3d 1331 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (Nos. 15-1391, 15-1393, 15-1394), 2015 WL 4400825, at *16–17.
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review but holding that the definitional determination of a covered
business method patent is reviewable after a final decision on the
merits.146 Subsequent panels, bound by Versata, reached the same
conclusion until the entire Federal Circuit this year considered
whether the definition of a covered business method might be re-
considered en banc.
However, in a significant split, the court in Secure Axcess v. PNC
Bank denied en banc rehearing.147 Of the twelve judges who partici-
pated, five dissented from the denial of en banc consideration.148
And of the five dissenters, three—Judges Dyk, Wallach, and
Hughes—further dissented from the holding of Versata, that deter-
minations of whether patents meet the covered business method
definition are reviewable.149 They argued instead that the Versata
panel decision did not survive the Supreme Court’s holding in
Cuozzo, where a materially identical nonappealability provision was
at work.150
Following the en banc denial in Secure Axcess, but possibly sens-
ing a receptive audience, the Patent Office has now, for the first
time, expressly sought deference for its interpretation of the statu-
tory covered business method definition. In SmartFlash v. Samsung,
the agency suggested that its interpretation is “consistent with the
text, legislative debate history, and purpose of the statute, and,
moreover, it is sensible, practical, and longstanding”—and deserv-
ing of Skidmore deference.151 How the Federal Circuit responds to
this request for interpretive deference may do much to shape the
agency’s continued use of the AIA nonappealability provisions as a
platform for its policy agenda.
3. Stacking PTAB Panels
The other major way in which the Patent Office has asserted
itself is the controversial practice of panel stacking. Panel stacking
146. 793 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (rejecting the contention that the
court may not review whether a given patent is a qualifying covered business
method patent).
147. Secure Axcess, L.L.C. v. PNC Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 859 F.3d 998 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
148. Id. at 1004 (Lourie, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1009–10 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 1010–11 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
151. Brief for Intervenor, Director of the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office at 23–24, SmartFlash, L.L.C. v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., Nos. 16-
2451, 16-2452, 16-2455, 16-2457, 16-2458, 17-1056, 17-1102, 17-1104, 17-1109, 17-
1110, 17-1111, 17-1833, 17-1834, 17-1835, 17-1836, 17-1847, 17-1837, 17-1846 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 27, 2017), 2017 WL 4402106, at *23–24.
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is a practice whereby the Patent Office leadership responds to
PTAB decisions it finds undesirable by expanding the original
three-judge panel in order to create a majority for the Office’s de-
sired outcome. The agency’s motivation for this has been candidly
political. In Yissum Research v. Sony Corp., the question arose during
oral argument whether, in situations where a PTAB decision ap-
peared to be an outlier, “[the Patent Office has] engaged the power
to reconfigure the panel so as to get the result [it wants].”152 The
Patent Office confirmed the practice and defended it as the Direc-
tor “trying to ensure that her policy position is being enforced by
the panels.”153 Similarly, in Nidec v. Zhongshan, the Federal Circuit
questioned whether uniformity, even if desirable and desired by the
PTAB, could legitimately be achieved through panel stacking
“where the PTAB can look at a prior decision and say, ‘Well we
don’t like that, let’s jump back in there and change that?’”154 The
question went unanswered amid other questions about how addi-
tional PTAB judges are assigned.155
The relationship of the practice of panel stacking to the
agency’s policy agenda is twofold. In a direct sense, the ability of
Patent Office leadership to stack the PTAB with additional judges
until the desired outcome is reached allows the agency to impose
policy preferences in a great many ways. These include particular-
ized applications of patent law that are specific to a given technol-
ogy, a given industry, a given type of challenger, a given type of
patent owner, or any other attribute of interest. However, these
sorts of policy vindications are short-term gratifications at best and
potentially inappropriate distortions of the adjudicatory process at
worst.
The longer-term benefit to Patent Office policymaking from
panel stacking would be strong deference under Chevron, even if
the relevant opinions themselves were non-precedential. The Pat-
ent Office has, indeed, used the practice already to argue in favor
of Chevron deference—though only on procedural matters, such as
in Yissum where the agency’s interpretation of the inter partes re-
152. Oral Argument at 47:20, Yissum Research Dev. Co. of the Hebrew Univ.
of Jerusalem v. Sony Corp., 626 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (mem.) (Nos. 15-
1342, 15-1343), http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2015-1342
.mp3 [www.perma.cc/S6AQ-C6EE].
153. Id. at 47:35.
154. Oral Argument at 25:27, Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean
Motor Co., 868 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (No. 16-2321), http://oralargu-
ments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2016-2321.mp3 [https://perma.cc/X74B-
6QY6].
155. Id. at 25:40.
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view joinder statute was at issue.156 The Patent Office argued that its
diligent use of panel-stacking, coordinated by the Director to gener-
ate a uniform body of case outcomes, was a way of speaking consist-
ently on the issue, such that its determinations ought to be granted
Chevron deference.157 Speaking consistently with input from the
agency head herself, in turn, may or may not be necessary in order
to “speak with the force of law” for Chevron purposes—but it does
appear to be sufficient.158 The agency argued that it had met this
standard. Even so, the Federal Circuit declined to reach the argu-
ment, disposing of the case instead with a summary affirmance.159
Still, as with the covered business method definition,160 the latitude
of the Patent Office to seek deference, or otherwise to shield itself
from judicial scrutiny in service of its policymaking agenda, is likely
to change as and when the Federal Circuit continues to give its
feedback.
C. Patent Office Intervention in PTAB Appeals
It is in this broader policymaking framework of conducting
PTAB review, with the Patent Office leveraging and enlarging im-
munity from judicial review and seeking Skidmore or Chevron defer-
ence, with the stark potential for politicized outcomes, that the
agency’s intervenor power should be evaluated and understood. In-
deed, in many of the cases already discussed as part of the Patent
Office’s strategy, it was as intervenor that the agency entered—
rather than, for example, as amicus curiae. In the debate over non-
appealable screening in inter partes review, the Patent Office was
an intervenor in Cuozzo, Wi-Fi One, and SAS Institute. In the arc of
cases regarding the definition of a covered business method patent,
the Patent Office was an intervenor in Versata, SightSound, and Blue
Calypso and is currently an intervenor in SmartFlash. And in the
cases where panel-stacking came to light at oral argument, the Pat-
ent Office was an intervenor in both Yissum and Nidec. In short,
intervention in Federal Circuit appeals has been a central feature in
156. Brief for Intervenor, Director of the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office at 2, 9–11, Yissum Research Dev. Co. of the Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem
v. Sony Corp., 626 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (mem.) (Nos. 15-1342, 15-1343),
https://www.patentspostgrant.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/34/images/Interve
norbrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/337H-5FK4].
157. Id. at 19–20.
158. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 100, at 1581–84 (summarizing the debate R
over whether “adjudications overseen by agency heads and/or treated as preceden-
tial by the agency” are the only adjudications that merit Chevron deference).
159. Yissum, 626 F. App’x. 1006.
160. See supra Part II.B.2.
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how the Patent Office has asserted its post-AIA policymaking
ambitions.
This is fitting, for the statutory power of the Patent Office to
intervene in appeals from the PTAB was itself a creation of the
AIA.161 Previously, the agency was a mandatory co-appellee in all
Federal circuit appeals from a reexamination or simply as an appel-
lee from a refusal to proceed with ex parte reexamination.162 The
AIA removed reexaminations from the set of cases in which the
agency was obliged to appear and added the current authority to
intervene, using language that signals at least some discretion for
the Patent Office.163
Although this statutory revision was virtually unremarked in
the AIA’s legislative history,164 it raised analytical and empirical
questions among commentators. As a matter of institutional struc-
ture, for example, John Golden observed that the power to inter-
vene on appeal in the Federal Circuit—instead of a power of
independent adjudicatory review for the Director to supervise the
PTAB—is an important deviation from the standard APA concep-
tion of formal adjudication.165 In Golden’s account, this structure
suggests that “Congress arguably placed the Federal Circuit in the
authoritative position analogous to that of ‘the agency.’”166 If this is
an accurate view of Congressional intent, it reinforces pre-AIA no-
tions of Federal Circuit primacy. It also invites robust use of the
powers that the Patent Office does have, if the agency is to advance
its policymaking agenda at all, because the Federal Circuit is likely
to have its own strongly held views regarding proper patent
policy.167
161. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 7(c)(3), 125
Stat. 284, 314–15 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 143 (2012)).
162. 35 U.S.C. § 143 (2006) (requiring that, in “an ex parte case or any reex-
amination case, the Director shall submit to the court in writing the grounds for the
decision of the Patent and Trademark Office, addressing all the issues involved in
the appeal” (emphasis added)).
163. 35 U.S.C. § 143 (2012) (providing that the Director “shall have the right
to intervene,” but not the obligation, in appeals from administrative patent validity
reviews).
164. See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act:
Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 543 (2012) (indicating only a passing reference to
the provision in Senator Kyl’s remarks during floor debate in March 2011).
165. John M. Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover, 65
DUKE L.J. 1657, 1682–83 (2016).
166. Id. at 1683.
167. See, e.g., Sapna Kumar, The Accidental Agency?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 229, 229
(2013) (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence reveals an institutional
desire to act as “the de facto administrator of the Patent Act”).
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Moreover, given the agency’s discretion to intervene on a case-
by-case basis, it was unclear when and based upon what criteria the
agency would exercise its power.168 Dmitry Karshtedt recently spec-
ulated that, “[g]iven that the typical outcome of a post-issuance pro-
ceeding is patent invalidation, the PTO’s participation in Federal
Circuit appeals means that the agency will more or often than not
argue against the patentee whenever it intervenes.”169 Meanwhile,
where the agency’s purpose in intervening is to step in for an ab-
sent party to ensure fully adversarial vetting of the issues, it seems
virtually certain that the agency would only ever intervene on be-
half of an absent prevailing petitioner—a challenger that success-
fully obtained an invalidation in the PTAB and is either unwilling
or unable to defend against the patent owner’s appeal.170 These
points are salient because a meaningful discussion of how the Pat-
ent Office can or should intervene must begin with a realistic pic-
ture of how the agency has actually done so until now.
To that end, a comprehensive review of appeals from PTAB
decisions where the Patent Office appeared as an appellate inter-
venor revealed 145 docketed Federal Circuit cases. Taking consoli-
dations into account, these cases reflected 96 distinct disputes
where the Patent Office intervened. Every intervenor brief that the
agency filed was in full or partial defense of the PTAB’s position or
of some larger structural value associated with administrative adju-
dication—never in opposition to the PTAB’s stance.171
Across these 96, the party that challenged patent validity in the
PTAB below participated in the appeal in a total of 68 disputes
(70.8%) and was either unwilling or unable to participate in a total
of 28 disputes (29.2%). Across the same 96 disputes, the patent
challenger prevailed below in the PTAB and came to the appeal to
defend its victory in 77 disputes (80.2%); the patent owner pre-
vailed in the PTAB in only 19 disputes (19.8%). Given that the Pat-
ent Office appeal always supported the PTAB, these findings
168. David L. McCombs et al., Federal Circuit Appeals from the PTAB: A New
Game or Just the Same Old Practice?, 95 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 240, 253
(2013).
169. Dmitry Karshtedt, Acceptance Instead of Denial: Pro-Applicant Positions at the
PTO, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 319, 342 n.129 (2017).
170. The converse case would be that the patent owner successfully defended
its patent in the PTAB, the losing petitioner appealed, and the patent owner de-
clined to appear. In such a case, the Patent Office would be standing in for a
patentee who had no interest in defending its victory. Expending resources on this
scenario seems highly unlikely.
171. The agency submitted briefing in 93 disputes; the rest were terminated
early.
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confirm Karshtedt’s conjecture: the agency did, indeed, intervene
against the patentee far more often than not, by a 4:1 ratio.
Of the 68 disputes where the PTAB challenger went on to par-
ticipate in the appeal, the PTAB challengers came to appeal as win-
ners in a total of 49 disputes (72.1%); only in 19 disputes (27.9%)
did they come to appeal having lost in the PTAB. Notably, of the 28
remaining disputes, where the PTAB challenger did not participate
in the appeal, every dispute had been a victory for the challenger.
In other words, the Patent Office never intervened in an appeal
where the patent challenger lost in the PTAB and was then unwill-
ing or unable to appeal. As expected,172 then, where the patent
challenger was absent from the appeal and the Patent Office
stepped in, it was always after a validity challenge had succeeded in
the PTAB below. These findings are summarized in Table 1.173
These descriptive tabulations confirm the intuition that taking
specific positions in Federal Circuit appeals from PTAB decisions
has, indeed, been a meaningful part of how the Patent Office uses
PTAB review as a policymaking vehicle. Policy-relevant features of
agency intervention include a preference for defending the PTAB’s
decisions, for intervening even when adversary parties are both par-
ticipating, and for standing in for validity challengers that are ab-
sent on appeal, but not for absent patent owners. Notably, the
combination of defending PTAB decisions and standing in for ab-
sent validity challengers suggests that it is a Patent Office priority
that findings of invalidity be affirmed, but not necessarily findings
of validity.
IV.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INTERVENTION
Until now, Patent Office decisions to intervene have been
shaped entirely by the agency’s policy agenda under the broad as-
sumption that the agency was not legally constrained, let alone con-
stitutionally constrained, in those decisions. Indeed, that
assumption forms the basis for the Patent Office’s position in
Knowles Electronics v. Matal,174 the case in which the Federal Circuit
has finally inquired about those constraints. Based on the observed
usage of Patent Office intervention, this part now turns to the issues
172. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. R
173. Case data on USPTO intervention in the Federal Circuit was gathered
using Docket Navigator.  Data about the agency’s positions was hand-coded from
its briefs in those cases and is on file with the author.
174. See generally Supplemental Brief for Intervenor, Knowles Elecs., L.L.C. v.
Matal, No. 16-1954, 2017 WL 3399631 (Fed. Cir. July 31, 2017).
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of constitutional standing raised in Knowles.175 Recent scholarship
and Supreme Court case law suggest that the Patent Office may,
indeed, have to show standing in order to exercise its intervention
authority. Standing doctrine and administrative law constraints
limit the substantive positions that the agency can take as inter-
venor. Under certain conditions, these obligations and constraints
may also have influence on intervention by private parties in ap-
peals from PTAB reviews of patent validity.
A. Standing to Intervene
The need for standing to participate in a federal court pro-
ceeding is a familiar application of Article III’s “case or controversy”
requirement.176 A party that lacks necessary standing must be ex-
cluded, and the absence of standing bars the court jurisdictionally
from hearing the case.177 Patent Office authority under section 143
implicates two important details of the somewhat discordant law
and commentary in this area: the relationship between standing
and the rights of intervenors and the side of the dispute on which
the standing inquiry is directed.178 The difficulty of reconciling
standing with intervention—specifically intervention as a matter of
right—is, ironically, that they are analytically quite similar.
Standing generally requires the existence of an injury, the
traceability of the injury to particular conduct, and the redres-
sability of the injury by the relief that is sought.179 To have an injury
is to suffer “an invasion of a legally protected interest” in a “con-
crete and particularized” manner and with “actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical” timing.180 To trace the injury to
particular conduct, meanwhile, is to attribute causation, and this
naturally raises inferential difficulties when multiple possible causes
175. See Knowles Elecs., L.L.C. v. Matal, No. 16-1954 (Fed Cir. June 30, 2017)
(per curiam) (order requesting supplemental briefing), https://cdn.patentlyo
.com/media/2017/06/KnowlesOrder.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VXQ-LHK2].
176. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
177. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975) (explaining that
“the standing question is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal-court
jurisdiction”).
178. A third potential detail, the distinction that the Patent Office can inter-
vene in appeals rather than in courts of first instance, is actually largely irrelevant.
The principles underlying FED. R. CIV. P. 24, which governs intervention in the
U.S. district courts, may also apply in the U.S. courts of appeal. UAW v. Scofield,
382 U.S. 205, 217 n.10 (1965).
179. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
180. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted).
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may be at work.181 To show a likelihood of redress is similarly an
exercise in causation, for the remedy sought must actually bring
about an end to the relevant injury.182 Otherwise, the judicial ac-
tion urged by the party is animated, impermissibly, by a “genera-
lized grievance.”183
The right to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24 reflects similar concerns, and this similarity is helpful to consider
when evaluating how Article III standing might be deemed satis-
fied.184 Intervention of right first requires an interest in subject of
the action.185 Like the injury requirement of standing, the inter-
venor’s interest reflects a stake in the dispute. Intervention of right
also requires a risk that the interest will be impaired by the disposi-
tion of the lawsuit.186 Like the traceability requirement, this calls
for a causal connection between the interest at stake and the conse-
quences of denying participation. Finally, intervention of right re-
quires a comparably improved ability to protect the interest
through intervention.187 Like the redressability requirement, this
also demands a showing that the relief sought—intervening in the
action—will make a meaningful difference with regard to the inter-
est at stake.
One difficulty with these doctrinal overlaps is that a case’s facts
may satisfy one set of inquiries but not the other.188 For example,
an injury for standing purposes must be fairly specific and personal-
ized, but the interest at stake for an intervenor may be impaired in
fairly broad fashion and still qualify.189 The mere prospect of stare
181. See id. at 560–61 (discussing, e.g., the independent action of third parties
not before the court).
182. Id. at 561–62.
183. Id. at 575.
184. The comparison to FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) is also salient for private-
party intervenors. See infra Part IV.C.
185. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (requiring the intervenor to “claim[ ] an interest
relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action”).
186. Id. (requiring the intervenor to be “so situated that disposing of the ac-
tion may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its
interest”).
187. Id. (limiting the court’s obligation to allow intervention where “existing
parties adequately represent that interest”).
188. As Gregory Manring has argued, neither inquiry “can subsume the
other.” Gregory R. Manring, Note, It’s Time for an Intervention!: Resolving the Conflict
Between Rule 24(a)(2) and Article III Standing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2525, 2542
(2017).
189. 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1908.1 (3d ed. 2017) (discussing “Intervention under the 1966 Amended Rule—
What Constitutes a Sufficient Interest”).
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decisis from an unfavorable judgment can be a sufficient intervenor
interest,190 as can the prospect of future adverse litigation191 or po-
tential inability to assert future claims.192 On the other hand, it is
likely that any of these interests would, by itself, be too speculative
an injury to establish party standing. As a result, one cannot assume
that a party that can satisfy the intervention standard could necessa-
rily show standing if that showing were required.193
Thus, the mere fact that the Patent Office can intervene in a
Federal Circuit appeal from a PTAB decision does not, by itself,
necessarily mean that the Patent Office has standing to do so. The
question then is whether it is necessary separately to show standing.
As the Court has explained, it is not always necessary. Under
the one-plaintiff rule, multiple parties that jointly bring a claim for
relief must show standing only for one party, and separate showings
for the remaining parties are unnecessary.194 This rule also permits
intervenors to enter a case on the side of a party that has already
shown standing, with no separate inquiry into the intervenor’s
standing.195 To this, the Court in Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates last
Term added the clarification that an intervenor cannot rely on the
standing of another party in this way if the intervenor seeks relief
190. See, e.g., Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004);
Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 302 F.3d 1242, 1258 (11th Cir. 2002); Utah
Ass’n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1254 (10th Cir. 2001).
191. See, e.g., California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436 (9th Cir.
2006).
192. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Albert Inv. Co., 585 F.3d 1386 (10th Cir.
2009); Ford v. City of Huntsville, 242 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 2001).
193. The scope of this caveat is an unresolved empirical question, and a cir-
cuit split has grown around the intuitions of different courts about how to craft
predictable doctrine in the face of the empirical uncertainty. See Elizabeth Zwick-
ert Timmermans, Note, Has the Bowsher Doctrine Solved the Debate?: The Relationship
Between Standing and Intervention as of Right, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1411, 1428–40
(2009) (discussing the circuit split on whether the requirements for standing and
intervention are equivalent).
194. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986). The one-plaintiff rule has also been termed the
Bowsher doctrine. See, e.g., Timmermans, supra note 193. The term “one-plaintiff R
rule,” see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, One Good Plaintiff Is Not Enough, 67 DUKE L.J. 481
(2017), avoids confusion. The term “Bowsher doctrine” may also refer to the sub-
stantive holding of that case, which involved active Congressional supervision of
officers charged with executing the laws that Congress enacts. Hanah Metchis
Volokh, Congressional Immunity Grants and Separation of Powers: Legislative Vetoes of
Federal Prosecutions, 95 GEO. L.J. 2017, 2037–38 (2007).
195. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003), overruled on other grounds
by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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that is different from what the party with proven standing seeks.196
The one-plaintiff rule is the subject of a compelling recent critique
by Aaron-Andrew Bruhl,197 but at present, it remains a doctrine
with considerable precedential force.198
Thus, the Patent Office as intervenor may be able avoid having
to show its own standing, but only if the agency has entered the case
on the side of a party that does establish standing, and so long as
the agency does not seek relief that is different from what that
friendly party seeks. This reveals, importantly, that the Patent Office
cannot rely on the standing of a friendly party that declines to ap-
pear. The Court explained in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona
that standing “must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just
as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first in-
stance.”199 Where the friendly party with proven standing declines
to appear, the intervenor “cannot step into the shoes of the original
party unless the intervenor independently fulfills the requirements
of Article III”—even where the intervenor takes the same position
as that of the absent party.200 The question then is whether an inter-
venor can rely on the standing of an adverse party.
The answer is likely no. Adverse parties must have standing in-
dependently of each other. Contrary to popular shorthand that a
plaintiff’s duty to show standing means that standing is required
only from plaintiffs, standing to defend is necessary as well.201 To
be sure, a defendant is likely to show standing, as most defendants
face the risk of injury from an adverse judgment and so have
enough of a stake in the case to satisfy Article III.202 Nevertheless,
the case-or-controversy requirement demands standing “to sue or
defend,” not merely standing to sue.203
196. 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017).
197. See Bruhl, supra note 194. R
198. Id. at 535.
199. 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997).
200. Id. at 64–65 (citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986)). The
friendly party with proven standing was absent both in Arizonans for Official English
and in Diamond. In both cases, the Court held that a separate Article III standing
inquiry was necessary for the intervenor who purported to represent the position
of the absent party. Id.
201. See Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litiga-
tion, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1550 (2012).
202. Id. at 1551–52; see Joan Steinman, Shining a Light in a Dim Corner: Stand-
ing to Appeal and the Right to Defend a Judgment in the Federal Courts, 38 GA. L. REV.
813, 831 (2004).
203. See Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 64. This view calls into ques-
tion the Federal Circuit’s recent panel decision in Personal Audio, L.L.C. v. Elec.
Frontier Found., 867 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2017). In Personal Audio, the successful
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This is particularly problematic for the Patent Office because it
often intervenes specifically to step in for an absent party whose
position is in line with the agency’s views.204 The intervenor stand-
ing cases reveal that the agency cannot rely on the standing either
of a friendly party that is absent or of an adverse party that is pre-
sent. In such cases, it must establish its own standing in order to
exercise its intervenor authority. Moreover, even where both parties
to the PTAB adjudication are present on appeal, the Patent Office
can rely on the one-plaintiff rule and avoid a separate standing in-
quiry only to the extent that it seeks relief identical to what its
friendly party seeks.205
These constraints apply to interventions in favor of patent va-
lidity challengers or patent owners alike. The revealed preference
of the Patent Office for siding with validity challengers, though,
does mean that as a practical matter, the agency must show inde-
pendent standing more often than if it intervened on behalf of the
patent owner. Patent owners who suffer invalidation in the PTAB
will have standing to appeal the deprivation of their property inter-
ests, but challengers who suffer defeat may or may not.206 Those
who do not will leave the Patent Office obliged to establish its own
standing on appeal. Close to a third of Patent Office interventions
on appeal fit this pattern (29.2%),207 making the standing require-
ment a potentially significant constraint on the agency’s continued
use of its intervenor authority as a means for advancing policy aims
through Federal Circuit appeals. Meanwhile, when both parties do
appear, whichever side the Patent Office favors as intervenor, the
agency may still have to establish its own standing where its position
promotes a larger structural value or otherwise looks beyond the
parties’ immediate dispute—as it often does.208 And in making the
case for standing in these situations, an agency interest that is
“shared generally with the public at large in the proper application
of the Constitution and laws will not do.”209
PTAB challenger (EFF) was “not constitutionally excluded from appearing in
court to defend the PTAB decision in its favor” because it was the unsuccessful
patent owner who was invoking judicial review in defense of its patent claims. 867
F.3d at 1250.
204. See supra Part III.C.
205. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. R
206. See Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258,
1261–62 (Fed. Cir. 2014); supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. R
207. See supra Part III.C.
208. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. R
209. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997). The
Patent Office itself seems to have taken just this course, however. It argued in sup-
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B. The Scope of Intervention
The principles of intervenor standing do not merely require
the Patent Office independently to show its standing in certain situ-
ations. In the absence of such an independent showing, those prin-
ciples also constrain what substantive positions the agency may take
upon intervening. Where the agency satisfies Article III by relying
on a party with proven standing, Town of Chester confirms that the
agency cannot seek “relief that is different” from what that party
seeks.210
Whether differences between Patent Office arguments and liti-
gant arguments during a Federal Circuit appeal amount to differ-
ent relief is difficult to predict. One may define relief at a high level
of generality, tending to favor findings that the forms of relief
sought by two different parties are essentially the same. Conversely,
one may define relief at a high level of specificity, tending to favor
the opposite outcome. The Court in Town of Chester did point to
differences in the “form of relief requested in the complaint” as being
enough to trigger a separate standing inquiry,211 such as where one
party seeks money damages and the other seeks an injunction.212 It
is unclear from Town of Chester itself whether this was intended
merely as a sufficient condition and not also a necessary one.
Apart from standing, the substantive positions that the Patent
Office may properly take as an intervenor in PTAB validity chal-
lenge appeals are also constrained by ordinary administrative law.
Under the Chenery doctrine, a reviewing federal court may uphold
an agency’s action only on the grounds that the agency itself cited
as its basis for the decision.213 The court may also reverse the
agency, of course, but to affirm on grounds not articulated by the
agency—though acceptable in court-court review—is inapt in court-
agency review for reasons of separation of powers.214 The Patent
Office in Knowles Electronics expressed some agreement with this
plemental briefing for the Knowles case that it has Article III standing “to advocate
for the correct application of the federal patent laws.” Supplemental Brief for In-
tervenor at 9, Knowles Elecs., L.L.C. v. Matal, No. 16-1954, 2017 WL 3399631, at *9
(Fed. Cir. July 31, 2017). Nevertheless, there are certainly cognizable interests that
the United States may assert as sovereign in showing standing. Cf. Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007) (concluding that the quasi-sovereign interests of
Massachusetts entitle it to “special solicitude” in the standing inquiry).
210. 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017).
211. Id. at 1650–51 (emphasis added).
212. Id. at 1651.
213. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943).
214. Id. at 95.
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view about its Chenery obligations.215 However, where an issue on
appeal is one on which the PTAB ruled below, the agency reserved
to itself the right to take a different position on the issue.216
This stance is somewhat puzzling. Arguing that an agency ac-
tion should be upheld because position X is correct seems necessa-
rily to be a different ground for affirmance than arguing that the
agency action should be upheld because position X is incorrect.
Regardless of what other position the Patent Office advances on
appeal, reversing itself on the correctness of the PTAB’s reasoning
would, at minimum, seem to be in tension with Chenery.217 Moreo-
ver, grounds for affirmance—like forms of relief—may be defined
broadly or narrowly and thereby also produce different outcomes.
The need for clarity on the scope for Patent Office intervention,
therefore, invites answers to the jurisprudential question of how to
determine the appropriate level of generality in both the separate-
relief inquiry and the Chenery-grounds inquiry.
C. Implications for Private Intervenors
Answering these jurisprudential questions will also do much to
guide private parties who may wish to intervene, as the Patent Of-
fice does, in Federal Circuit appeals from validity challenges in the
PTAB. Without statutory authority such as what the Patent Office
enjoys under section 143, private intervenors face the additional
step of either establishing their rights to intervene218 or obtaining
leave to do so permissively.219 The standard for what kinds of inter-
ests are sufficient for intervention of right is lenient relative to the
sorts of injuries required for standing.220 The particular interests
that courts have approved before are well-suited for intervention by
private parties.
For example, a would-be intervenor can properly assert the
prospect of stare decisis from an unfavorable judgment.221 This
would be of interest not only to firms or advocacy organizations
who are engaged with patent policy, but also to potential infringers
215. Reply in Support of Supplemental Brief for Intervenor at 5, Knowles
Elecs., L.L.C. v. Matal, No. 16-1954, 2017 WL 4157187, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 5,
2017).
216. Id.
217. See 318 U.S. at 95 (referring to affirmance upon the same “grounds on
which the agency acted,” not on different grounds pertaining to the same issue
(emphasis added)).
218. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
219. See id. 24(b).
220. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. R
221. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. R
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who sensibly wish to avoid relitigating the validity of a particular
patent or the probative force of a certain piece of prior knowledge
in a given technology, or against a given patented invention or class
of inventions. Similarly, a would-be intervenor can properly assert
the prospect of future adverse litigation.222 This would likely be of
great interest to potential infringers of the patent in question, as
the majority of parties (70%) who bring a PTAB validity challenge
are prior defendants in an infringement lawsuit in U.S. district
court on the same patent.223
Moreover, under the one-plaintiff rule, intervening on appeal
would solve the significant problem of standing for private parties
who could not otherwise make the leap from agency adjudication
to Article III review.224 The AIA proceedings’ liberal rules on join-
der and their lack of standing requirements have mitigated a con-
siderable collective action problem in bringing patent validity
challenges,225 but these effects are limited to the agency adjudica-
tion process. So long as an intervenor who seeks the same relief as a
party with proven standing need not establish its own standing,
however, validity challengers without standing seem to have a back
door into the appellate review process. Even parties who were not
involved in the PTAB adjudication may reasonably infer the impor-
tance of a case from the fact that it was appealed at all, and opt into
the appeal.226 In other words, this selection effect offers savings of
the cost that a party would otherwise have to bear in searching out
patents and patent cases in which to commit its resources, albeit at
the expense of entering late in the case after many issues have al-
ready been framed or even resolved.
Current intervention in Federal Circuit appeals is largely,
though not exclusively, a Patent Office activity. Analysis of data on
intervenors in the Federal Circuit reveals that, during the period of
December 2013 to April 2017, when the Patent Office intervened in
145 docketed cases,227 142 private parties intervened in only 43
222. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. R
223. See Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 4, at 73–74. R
224. See Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258,
1261–62 (Fed. Cir. 2014); supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. R
225. See Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 4, at 49–50, 59, 65–66, 74–75. R
226. It is well documented in the law and economics literature that the cases
that survive settlement and post-trial process such as motions for judgments not-
withstanding the verdict that proceed to appeal are likely to be uncertain under
existing law. See generally Richard L. Revesz, Litigation and Settlement in the Federal
Appellate Courts: Impact of Panel Selection Procedures on Ideologically Divided Courts, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 685 (2000); Priest & Klein, supra note 19. R
227. See supra Part III.C.
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cases.228 By contrast, during the equivalent preceding period of
February 2010 to November 2013, 63 private parties intervened in
30 docketed cases while the Patent Office apparently did not inter-
vene in any. The distribution of private-party intervenors after De-
cember 2013, when the Patent Office began exercising its authority
under section 143, appears to have shifted toward more concen-
trated, multi-party intervention as compared to the pre-December
2013 period. Table 2 and Figure 1 summarize these findings.
A decline in the relative share of private-party intervention cou-
pled with more concentrated case selection by private parties sug-
gests a net offloading onto the Patent Office of the responsibility to
intervene. This is significant precisely because private party inter-
venors will often have a greater ability than the Patent Office to
show an interest that is sufficient to intervene in a given case. Still,
rather than entrust the protection of larger social interests to a dif-
fuse group of private-party intervenors, Congress has recognized
the coordinating and policymaking function that agency interven-
tion can properly serve—within constitutional limits. When under-
stood this way, further intervention by private parties remains a
useful adjunct, especially for those who may be dissatisfied by the
agency’s priorities. Thus, if the decline in private-party intervention
has reached, or will soon reach, some equilibrium with agency in-
tervention, that outcome seems preferable to a complete abdication
by private parties of the effort to intervene.
What remains unknown, moreover, is whether the private par-
ties that intervened, either before or after the Patent Office’s ascen-
dant role, participated in the dispute below as well or intervened
only on appeal. It is also unknown whether these private-party inter-
venors could have shown, or did show, independent Article III
standing. Further analysis of these issues would shed light on the
hypotheses above regarding selective intervention on appeal and
the use of the one-plaintiff rule to sidestep a standing inquiry be-
tween agency adjudication and Article III review.
V.
CONCLUSION
The recently created authority of the Patent Office to inter-
vene in appeals from its own administrative adjudications of patent
validity has conferred both discretion and obligation upon the
agency. The observed current usage of this statutory intervention
228. Data on Federal Circuit intervenors was gathered using Docket Naviga-
tor. See http://www.docketnavigator.com [https://perma.cc/NVF6-U4XH].
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authority is best understood as part of a larger campaign of poli-
cymaking that the agency has undertaken after a long period of
Federal Circuit primacy in U.S. patent law. Choices by agency lead-
ership about when to intervene and what positions to take are, by
prevailing understandings of Article III standing generally and in-
tervenor standing in particular, relatively unfettered, particularly
under the one-plaintiff rule. Recent Supreme Court guidance
about the limits of intervenor standing, however, should give the
agency pause in pressing the highly expansive view that it has re-
cently taken before the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit, for its
part, has an opportunity in the currently pending Knowles Electronics
case to clarify how these general principles of justiciability and pro-
cedure will reshape participation and engagement with the patent
system in the era of PTAB review, not only by the Patent Office but
also by the public.
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APPENDIX: TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. Procedural Posture of Consolidated Disputes in Federal











Won in the 
PTAB 
49 28 77 
Challenger 
Lost in the 
PTAB 
19 0 19 
Subtotal 68 28 96 
Table 2. Intervention in Docketed Federal Circuit Cases before
and after the Patent Office Began Using its § 143
Intervenor Authority
Intervenor Feb. 2010–Nov. 2013 Dec. 2013–Sept. 2017 
Patent Office 0 cases 145 cases 
Private Party 63 parties 30 cases 
142 parties 
43 cases 
229. Case data on USPTO intervention in the Federal Circuit was gathered
using Docket Navigator. See http://www.docketnavigator.com [https://perma.cc/
NVF6-U4XH]. Data about the agency’s positions was hand-coded from its briefs in
those cases.
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Figure 1. Distribution of Private-Party Intervenors across Single-
and Multi-Intervenor Appeals in the Federal Circuit
